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DISINNOVATION IN THE AMERICAN STATES:
POLICY TOWARD HEALTH SYSTEMS AGENCIES
Keith Mueller and John Comer
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Political Science Department
ABSTRACT
Requiring the states to involve consumers in health
planning through local health planning boards (HSAs) was an
attempt by the federal government to control health care costs.
Elimination of this requirement more recently has meant some
states have discontinued the program. The elimination of HSAs
can be considered a case of policy disinnovation. Drawing on
the innovation literature, the following variables were expected
to correlate, although negatively, with elimination of HSAs:
value added to manufacturing, average acre value of farms, per
capita income, population living in metropolitan areas, and
party competition. All were found to correlate negatively.
Predisposition to spend reflected in per capita state
expenditures was also correlated negatively with elimination of
HSAs, as was the average daily hospital room charge and average
hospital cost per stay.
Innovation is a term that has been applied to the adoption
of new programs and policies by state governments. The process
by which policies diffuse among the American states has been
described and explained, the latter chiefly in terms of state
characteristics found to correlate with the adoption of a
particular policy. While it has been recognized that there is a
reverse process, disinnovation, there has been little, if any,
effort to describe and understand it. This can be attributed to
an ever widening public sector over the years, spurred on by the
demands and resources of the federal government. Withdrawal of
federal initiatives and funds more recently may, however, make
disinnovation a more frequent phenomenon and perhaps a more
frequently studied one. This paper examines one such
disinnovation, the elimination of health systems agencies (HSAs)
in the American states. More specifically, it explores the
-189-
correlation between characteristics of the states and
elimination of HSAs.
Health systems agencies are local health planning boards
provided for in the 1974 National Health Planning and Resource
Development Act in combination with Title 19 of the Social
Security Act (Medicare and Medicaid). Under the provisions of
the law (P.L. 93-641) and subsequent amendments in 1979, state
governments were to divide their states into local and/or area
wide health planning and development agencies which were to be
responsible for synthesizing HSA plans into a single statewide
plan. State governments would also be responsible for reviewing
HSA activities including HSA decisions on certificate of need
applications, i.e., applications from hospitals, nursing homes,
etc., for proposed construction and expansion of health care
facilities. Funds for HSA staff were to be provided from
federal monies. Failure of states to comply would mean a loss
of federal funds for hospital construction and medicare and
medicaid payments. A change in the law in 1981, however,
permitted states the option of meeting the health planning
requirements of the 1974 act without continuing HSAs.
One of the objectives of the 1974 act was to involve
consumers of health care services in health planning. Federal
regulations thus required that at least one half of the
membership of HSA boards be consumers. The remaining members
were to be health care professionals, e.g., physicians and
others involved in the provision of health care services.
Involving consumers in certificate of need review it was hoped,
would provide a check on unnecessary expansion of health care
facilities, limiting capital expenditures, and thus reducing the
cost of health care. While HSAs have increased the number of
consumers involved in health planning (Burlage, 1979; Sigelman,
1982), it is less clear what the impact of HSAs has been on
health care costs (Downs, 1982; Duhl and Blum, 1981). The
concern here, however, is with the response of state governments
to the change in federal policy toward HSAs. Withdrawing the
requirement that states have HSA planning boards meant that
states were free to retain or eliminate local planning boards.
The elimination of HSAs by a state can be considered a case of
disinnovation, and it is variation among the states in t.-s
regard that the study will try to explain.
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INNOVATION LITERATURE
Jack Walker has defined innovation as "simply a program or
policy that is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old
the program may be or how many other states have adopted it"
(Walker, 1971: 335). Disinnovation can be considered a program
or policy that is terminated or discontinued by a state (Rogers,
1962; Eyestone, 1977). While the focus of this study is
disinnovation, the literature on innovation provides a useful
framework.
Two principle questions are asked in research in policy
innovation in state government. 1. What are the patterns of
diffusion of policy innovations among the states? 2. Which
states are likely to be "early adopters" of policy innovations?
With respect to the first, Walker (1971), borrowing from
theories of human choice and organizational decision making,
suggests that decision makers in the states may look to other
states for cues regarding new programs and appropriate levels of
services. While a few states fancy themselves as leaders in the
adoption of new ideas and can be expected to move on their own,
most delay waiting for other states to act, particularly those
states which, for one reason or another, serve as a reference
point. Walker refers to regional reference groups. States
often compare themselves with others in their region and look to
these states for new ideas and programs. Certain states may
become regional pacesetters with new ideas failing to spread to
the region until adopted by the pacesetter. Thus, we might
expect patterns of diffusion to reflect a clustering pattern
through time, with little variation in time of adoption within
regions, but some variation between regions. We would also
expect those states that use the self starting states as
references to be the first to adopt innovations.
While regional ties work to slow the diffusion process and
lead to an evenness in the diffusion pattern, specialized
communication and increasing professionalism among state
decision makers may have the opposite effect. Walker (1971)
notes that the total time of diffusion has decreased over time.
For the period 1930-1966, the total time for innovations to
diffuse was 25.6 years, for 1870-1899, 52.3 years. The increase
in associations that monitor developments in state government,
such as the Council of State Governments, which disseminate
information on new ideas to the states and the development of
professional orientations among state decision makers, which
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leads to a commitment to improved ways of doing things, is
having an homogenizing effect on state government. The result
is a faster diffusion process, with typically laggard states
adopting much sooner than in the past.
There is also the impact of federal incentives stimulating
innovation diffusion. Welch and Thompson (1980) find, for
example, that programs with federal incentives diffuse more
rapidly than those without, and that positive incentives are
more effective in diffusing programs than negative incentives.
Light (1978) too, based on a survey of state administrators,
finds that the federal government is an important stimulus to
innovation, but observes that this varies with policy area. He
notes that the federal government is perceived by state
administrators as an important stimulus in the areas of human
resources and criminal justice, but less important in natural
resources and transportation. He concludes that the study of
innovation by policy area is a promising approach to
understanding the diffusion process. Downs and Mohr (1976)
reach similar conclusions. With respect to which states lead in
developing innovations, Grupp and Richards (1975) find variation
across policy areas.
Virginia Gray (1975) has also examined patterns of
diffusion of policy innovations in the states. Gray examines
twelve policies in the areas of education, welfare, and civil
rights. Employing a model based on the assumption that
interaction among adopters and non adopters, similar to Walker,
accounts for the spread of adoptions, she is able to generate a
regression reflecting the pattern of diffusion over time. The
predicted pattern for the twelve policies is a close fit to the
observed. The cumulative percentage of adopters is "S" shaped,
the frequency distribution normal. Gray also observes variation
in the diffusion process by policy area. The diffusion of
education policies follows a regular and consistent pattern.
Policies in the civil rights and welfare areas vary in diffusion
patterns. Moreover, states that are innovative, early adopters,
in one area are not necessarily innovative in another. Nor are
the same states necessarily innovative within policy areas,
i.e., a state may be quick to adopt one education innovation but
slow to adopt another. She concludes that "innovativenesa" is
both issue and time specific.
In spite of Gray's findings, differences among the states
in certain characteristics may be related to early adoption.
Gray herself finds that per capita personal income in the states
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distinguishes the first ten adopters with respect to the twelve
policies she examined. The governor's electoral margin was also
correlated with the first ten states to adopt. In an effort to
uncover general correlates of innovation, Walker (1971) ranked
the states by innovation scores based on 88 programs and
policics. Reasoning that available resources in terms of wealth
and expertise might lead to a willingness to experiment as well
as risk failure, he hypothesized that the larger and wealthier
states, those with the most developed industrial economies and
the largest cities, would have the highest innovation scores.
It is plausible, Walker suggests, to assume that the great
cosmopolitan centers of the country would likely be the most
adaptive and sympathetic to change, and thus, the first to adopt
new programs.
Consistent with this line of argument, Walker finds that
innovation scores do correlate with the value added to goods by
manufacturing, the average per acre value of farms, the size of
the urban population, and per capita income. He also examined
the correlation between degree of party competition,
malapportionment of the state legislature and innovation score.
Both were positively related to innovation. Correlations with
several other political variables lead Walker to conclude that
the states that adopt new programs more rapidly are bigger,
richer, more urban, more industrial, have more fluidity and
turnover among elected office holders, and have legislatures
that more adequately represent cities.
The Walker and Gray studies are particularly relevant to
this study. It is plausible to assume that some of the factors
found by them to correlate with inovation also correlate,
although negatively, with disinnovation. That is, it is
expected that those characteristics which are positively
correlated with early adoption are negatively correlated with
elimination. Based on this line of reasoning the following
propositions can be derived: The value added to goods by
manufacturing, average per acre value of farms, per capita
income, size of urban population, and degree of party
competition are inversely related to elimination of HSAs. It is
also logical to assume that Walker's innovation scores for the
states relate inversely to elimination.
Extending Walker's argument, expenditure levels among the
states might be another variable significant in accounting for
variation among the states in.elimination of HSAs. Per capita
state expenditures are not only another indicator of a state's
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wealth, but in some way may reflect a predisposition to spend.
If so, it is plausible to assume that states with higher levels
of expenditures are more likely to add to those levels with the
addition of programs than states with lower levels. In other
words, states currently spending at a high level are more likely
to retain HSAs than those spending at a lower level. Thus,
another proposition is that expenditures per capita are
inversely related to elimination of HSAs.
Other variables relevant to the particular policy lead to
another set of propositions. HSAs were set up to cut hospital
costs. Where hospital costs are high, it is plausible to assume
a greater need for HSAs. In other words, the higher hospital
costs are, the greater need to control them, and thus, the
greater the need to maintain cost cutting mechanisms such as
HSAs. Therefore, there are the following propositions: Average
daily hospital room charge and average hospital cost per stay
are inversely related to elimination of HSAs.
METHOD
The Omnibus Reconciliation Bill of 1981 gave the states the
option of retaining or eliminating HSAs. While some states
continue to deliberate the fate of HSAs and this makes the
study's conclusions somewhat tentative, many have decided
whether or not HSAs will continue operation. In the Spring of
1982, questionnaires were sent to the governors in the 50
states. Followup questionnaires were sent in the Summer to
those failing to respond to the first wave. Thirty-eight
questionnaires were returned, wijh 33 (66%) indicating that the
issue of HSAs had been resolved.
Responses from the 33 are the basis for the analysis.
States were categorized on the dependent variable, elimination
of HSAs based on their response to the following question: As
you know the federal requirements and support for the
continuation of Health Systems Agencies have been dropped.
Whether or not a state will continue with HSAs will be for each
state to decide. Some states may continue with HSAs and allow
them to operate as they did previously; other states may
eliminate them altogether. Still others may transfer the
functions of HSAs to other agencies of state government. Please
check the statement below which comes closest to what your state
is planning to do or may already have done. 1. No change. HSAs
will continue to operate as they have in the past. 2. HSAs will
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be eliminated, but their review functions will be transferred to
other state agencies. 3. HSAs will be eliminated.
Many responses did not fit neatly into the above three
categories. For example, some states indicated that HSAs would
continue but without the state providing funds. In most cases,
local government and/or private funding sources were mentioned.
Such responses were considered no change only if review
functions of HSAs with respect to certificate of need review
would continue. The transfer of HSA review functions to other
agencies also presents some problems of classification. The
nature of the review with respect to local input was not always
clear; nor was it obvious in the case of some states whether
certificate of need review would continue. In many such cases,
however, it was clear that certificate of need review would not
continue and consumer participation would be limited and/or not
expected, at least not in a way comparable to HSAs. One might
argue that such arrangements amount to elimination. Because of
the problems of classification, we have created two variables
based on these responses. One is a dichotomy with elimination
and transfer coded one, all other responses zero. A second
maintains all three categories. These two variables are
correlated with the independent variables outlined earlier.
ANALYSIS
Of the 33 useable responses, 24 (73%) states indicated that
HSAs were or would be eliminated; nine states (27%) indicated
the continued existence of HSAs with the same or basically the
same functions as before. Of the 24 indicating that HSAs would
be eliminated, 15 (45%) responded that the function of HSAs
would be transferred to other agencies of state government.
Thus, we have nine no change, 15 elimination but transfer of
function, and nine elimination with no transfer, or elimination
of structure and function.
Previous studies suggest a number of variables are
correlated with innovation, as defined by Walker, in the
American states. Table I shows the correlation, measured by
Pearson's correlation coefficient, between the two depe Vent
measures and the independent variables reviewed earlier. As a
check on the appropriateness of Pearson's correlation with a
trichotomous dependent variable, plots against each independent
variable were examined and showed patterns of relationship to be
reasonably linear. A check on the use of Pearson's with what
amounts to an ordinal classification was also made by
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Table 1. Correlates of discontinuation of HSAs
Elimination/ Elimination/
Transfer{ Transfer
No Change No Change
Value added by manu-
facturing (1977) -.13 -.17
Average per acre value of
farms (1980) -.33* *  -.23*
Per capita income (1979) -.12 -. 33**
Percent population living in
urban areas (1978) -.20 -.30**
Degree of party competition
(1974-1980) -.11 -.25"
Per capita state expenditures
(1978) -.13 -.29*
Average daily room charge
(1979) -.22* -.37**
Average cost of a hospital
stay (1978) -.33** -.41*
Walker's innovation score -. 23* -.28**
** Probability less than .05
* Probability .05 to .10
Coding: 1. Dependent variable coded 0 equal to no change; .5
transfer and 1 elimination. 2. Dependent variable coded 0
equal to no change and 1 equal to transfer and elimination.
Degree of party competition is coded 1,2,3, with 1 equal to one
party, 2 equal to modified one party, and 3 equal to two party.
Taken from John F. Bibby, et. al., "Parties in State
Politics" in Politics in the American States, ed. by Virginia
Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines (4th ed.; Boston:
Little, Brown, 1983) Walker's innovation scores are taken from
Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American
States," American Political Science Review 63: 880-889, 1969.
All other measures taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1980 (101st edition.)
Washington, D.C., 1980.
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calculating Spearman's rho. While somewhat lower in magnitude,
the results using rho were equivalent to Pearson's correlation.
We have selected to report our findings in terms of Pearson's
correlation because it is, we believe, more typically employed
and likely to be familiar to a wider audience, and because it
has multivariate extensions which permit more powerful
analytical techniques.
A negative correlation in the Table means that a variable
is inversely related to elimination of HSAs. Expectations
fashioned from the innovation literature suggest all
relationships should be negative and examination of the Table
shows that they are. The variables Walker found to correlate
with innovation are inversely correlated with disinnovation, as
is Walker's own innovation scale for the states. The pattern
holds with both the trichotomous and dichotomous measures,
although the correlations are somewhat higher for the dichotomy.
The finding holds out the prospect that disinnovation can be
explained by the same theoretical structure that underlies
innovation. Spending patterns too, relate negatively to
elimination of HSAs, which is consistent with the thesis that
predisposition to spend among the states is likely to lead to
the retnetion of innovations, at least those that cost money.
The Table also reveals that elements relevant to the particular
policy make a difference. Both average daily room charge and
average cost of hospital stay are negatively correlated with
elimination of HSAs. It may be that innovation and
disinnovation are correlated with variables that reflect wealth
and expertise, as Walker hypothesized, but it is also quite
plausible to assume that variables specific to a particular
policy can also be important. In some situations one can
anticipate that policy relevant factors can enhance prospects
for innovation or disinnovation, while in others, retard
prospects. In some cases, one can imagine that the influence of
policy factors may have effects opposite and perhaps stronger
than wealth and/or expertise. These possibilities may help to
explain what appears to be a contradiction in the literature on
innovation diffusion among the states.
While all the variables Walker examined in his study
correlated in the expected way with elimination of HSAs, the
correlations were quite modest. This may reflect the crude and
imprecise manner in which disinnovation is measured. But it
also raises the question of the utility of these variables for
understanding disinnovation. Why did the variables not
correlate higher? One can argue that slack resources, available
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expertise, and a willingness to take risks may push states with
these characteristics to innovate, however, once an innovation
is in place, neither expertise nor potential risk should play a
role in retaining it. Once a program is underway, the obstacle
of risk has been overcome and expertise, if by this we mean the
skill necessary to implement and administer a policy or program,
while still important, at least through the years immediately
following adoption, would presumably be less of a factor as a
state begins to acquire knowledge of the program or policy in
operation. Furthermore, we can anticipate that a tight fiscal
situation would not necessarily lead to withdrawal of an
innovation, particularly if interests have developed with a
stake in preserving it, which is often the case.
While no one would suggest giving up on the development of
what might be called a non policy specific explanation for
innovation or disinnovation at this point, with respect to
disinnovation, a more fruitful approach may be one that focuses
on factors and elements unique to the particular policy or group
of policies. This is especially likely to be the case where
policies remain controversial. Health planning or at least the
issue of who should be involved in it are quite controversial.
Therefore, we expect that policy specific and other
idiosyncratic factors will be important in explaining health
planning policy. In addition to patterns of health care costs,
one might expect variables such as the strength of the medical
lobby and the personal preferences of significant public
officials, e.g., governors, to be important.
Bivariate relationships do not allow one to sort out the
relative importance of variables in explaining a dependent
variable, however, a multiple regression procedure can. While
we must be cautious in our conclusions owing to the small number
of cases and intercorrelations among the independent variables,
regression provides additional evidence that bears on our
hypotheses. Table 2 contains the results of regressing the
dependent variable on the independent variables. The numbers in
the Table are standardized regression coefficients (betas). We
have included only one of the health care cost variables in the
regression because they are correlated (.68) with each other and
reflect basically the same thing.
The regression analysis shows Walker's variables, or some
of them, to be more important in explaining variation in policy
toward HSAs than either per capita state expenditures or average
cost of a hospital stay. While the latter are not unimportant,
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Table 2. A Regression Analysis of Correlates of
Discontinuation of HSAs
Elimination/ Elimination/
Transfer/ Transfer/
No Change No Change
Value added by manu-
facturing .061 .09
Average per acre value of
farms -.15 -.05
Per capita income .10 -.04
Percent population living in
urban areas -.20 -.25
Degree of party competition -.16 -.22
Per capita state expenditures -.18 -.28
Average cost of a hospital
stay -.11 -. 18
I. Numbers are standardized regressions coefficients (betas).
the variables Walker used as measures of wealth, expertise,
etc., rank higher at least in terms of their ability to explain
variation in the dependent variable. Although conclusions must
be considered tentative, analysis here would not allow us to
reject the thesis that conditions giving rise to adoption of
innovations are also important in the retention of innovations.
To be sure, further research is required not only with respect
to health policy but other areas of policy as well. If
disinnovation becomes mere widespread, as it may well, this
issue can be examined more fully.
CONCLUSION
Mandating consumer involvement in health planning through
HSAs in the states was an attempt by the federal government to
control health care costs. More recent elimination of this
requirement has meant some states have abandoned the program.
The discontinuation of HSAs can be considered a case of policy
disinnovation. While there have been several studies of
innovation in the states, little work has focused on
disinnovation. Drawing on the innovation literature, the
following variables were expected to correlate, although
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negatively, with elimination of HSAs: value added to
manufacturing, average per acre value of farms, per capita
income, population living in metropolitan areas, and party
competition. All were found to correlate negatively with
elimination of HSAs. However, correlations were not
particularly high. One explanation for this is that
disinnovation is something different than the reverse of
innovation, and therefore, variables that correlate highly with
one will not correlate highly with the other.
Predisposition to spend reflected in per capita state
expenditures was also inversely related to elimination of HSAs.
This too was expected. States willing to pay for one program or
policy, it is suspected are likely to pay for another. Two
policy specific variables also correlated with elimination of
HSAs. These were the average daily hospital room charge and
average cost per hospital stay. It is reasonable to expect that
where health care costs are high, the felt need to control costs
will be strong. The negative correlations for both confirm
this.
Much of the literature on innovation stresses the need for
policy specific research on factors related to adoption
patterns. While the data presented here would lead us to
concur, the data also direct us to consider the more general
influences suggested by Walker which reflect the fiscal and
intellectual capacity of the states. In seeking to understand
state responses to HSAs and perhaps other programs designed to
cut costs, patterns of health care costs within the states seem
to be an important variable. It appears, however, that they
work with other variables that also bear on such programs and
policies.
NOTES
1. Differences between respondent and non respondent states do
not appear to be severe, at least on the independent
variables included in the analysis. Statistically
significant differences, measured by a difference of means t
test (p equal to .05), exist only on the variables average
cost of a hospital stay and state expenditures per capita.
Non respondent states are mere likely to have higher
hospital costs per stay and higher expenditures per capita.
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2. While cases in the analysis do not constitute a random
sample, statistical tests can be considered as a check
against an undefined random process or some other source of
variation producing a result.
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